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Five Easy Pieces:
Recurrent Themes in American Property Law
Gregory S. Alexander*
The title of my article, "Five Easy Pieces," may not resonate with those
of you who are too young to remember Jack Nicholson as a budding young
movie star cut out of the James Dean mold. For those who do remember, it
is, of course, the title of one of Nicholson's early (and, to my mind,
greatest) movies.' Jack's five easy pieces were piano pieces, easy for him
to perform, less so for others. There was a certain irony about the word
"easy" in the title. The irony lay not only in the fact that just about
everyone else consider those pieces difficult, but, more deeply, because
those piano pieces were the only pieces of the life of Bobby Dupea, the
character whom Jack portrayed, that were easy for him. Life as a whole,
the big picture, was one great, almost impossible challenge for him.
My five easy pieces have their own ironic twist. They are rather different
but equally challenging in their own ways that first-year law students here
will readily recognize. My pieces, this piece, is really aimed at them. The
pieces I will discuss are five recurrent themes in American property law,
leit motifs, to continue the metaphor from the Nicholson movie, that run
throughout American legal doctrines. These themes provide a way of
structuring all of property law, adding coherence to what so often appears
to law students as an unintelligible rag-tag collection of rules and doctrines
that defy any attempt to construct an overarching framework for analysis. I
have given five simple labels to these recurrent topics: "conceptualizing
property," "categorizing property," "historicizing property," "enforcing
property," and "de-marginalizing property." We begin with how we

conceptualize property.

A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. This article is a somewhat
expanded
version of the Gifford Lecture, delivered at the University of Hawai'i Richardson School of
Law. I wish to thank Dean Avi Soifer for his typically warm and gracious hospitality during
my visit at the Richardson School of Law. I am deeply grateful to him. I am also grateful to
Joe Singer, who graciously and helpfully commented on an earlier draft.
FIVE EASY PIECES (Columbia Pictures 1970).
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I.

CONCEPTUALIZING PROPERTY

At least three different ways of conceptualizing ownership of property
exist in American legal thought and legal discourse. Introducing them in
chronological order, the first might be called the classical conception. This
is the understanding of ownership that is customarily attributed to Sir
William Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century English jurist, academic,
and scholar whose treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England,3 was
enormously influential on American lawyers into the twentieth century.
The classical view was captured by Blackstone's memorable definition of
ownership as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe.",4 As Jane Baron notes, "The Blackstonian
view posits nearly limitless rights consolidated in a single owner, who can
exclude all others." 5 Blackstone himself did not hold that view of
ownership.6 What we call the Blackstonian conception is really a trope, a
construct that we have come to attribute to Blackstone. This is why it is
better to refer to this conception as the "classical" conception of ownership.
The classical conception has three defining features. First, it conceives
of ownership as unified, rather than fragmented, a very important point, as
we will soon see. Second, it constructs ownership in terms of the simple
relationship between a person and a "thing." Third, the person in that
relationship is considered to have exclusive dominion over the thing, to be
the master of it, to the exclusion of everyone else in the world.
Now, this way of looking at ownership arguably captures the ordinary
non-lawyer's understanding of what it means to own property. Professor
Bruce Ackerman made that contention a number of years ago in his book
Private Propertyand the Constitution. Ackerman argued that the classical
conception reflects just the way in which a hypothetical ordinary lay
person, whom he dubbed "Layman," thought, or at least talked about
property and ownership. Ackerman asserted that lay people think of
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ownership pretty much in accordance with the classical conception: as
unitary, as a person-thing relationship, and as exclusive dominion.
Whether or not lay people think of ownership that way, it is no longer the
way in which most American lawyers think or talk about ownership. The
American Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 30s replaced the
classical conception with a second conception, commonly called the
"bundles-of-rights" conception. The attraction of the bundles-of-rights
metaphor to the Legal Realists and subsequent generations of American
lawyers is its flexibility. The bundle-of-rights theory has three significant
insights that contribute to its flexibility. First, as its name indicates, it
rejected the old idea that ownership is unitary, in favor of a fragmented
understanding of ownership. What this means is that ownership is
comprised of a number of claim-rights, such as the rights to use, possess,
exclude, manage, give, sell, and so on, and that no single one of these
claim-rights is essential to ownership.
Second, and closely related to the first, the bundles idea relaxed the view
of ownership as absolute, or nearly so, dominion by focusing attention on
the fact that ownership is a matter of one person's claim being relatively
better than another's, leaving open the possibility that such a claim might
yet be relatively weaker than a third person's claim. "Title," as we say, "is
relative."
Third, the bundle-of-rights conception shifts the focus from the
relationship between a person and a thing to the relationship between
persons. Ownership is a person-to-person relationship with respect to
things (not even really things, but assets). This aspect of the bundle-ofrights conception was important to the Legal Realists because they wanted
to emphasize the social character of ownership, that is, the fact that private
ownership of property is a matter of human relationships.
Although the bundle-of-rights conception has dominated American legal
discourse about ownership for nearly a century, today it is under attack. It
has been attacked by scholars who wish to concentrate attention on the ends
of property, including those who argue that a regime of private property
should aim at producing outcomes that are conducive of a "free and
democratic society." 8 The primary source of attack, however, comes from
scholars who view property as the "law of things." 9 These scholars object
to the bundle-of-rights conception not only because it does not focus
attention on things as the subject matter of property law but also, and
perhaps more importantly, because it tends to treat all of the twigs in the
8 Joseph William Singer, DemocraticEstates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic

Society, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1009 (2009).
9 Henry Smith, Propertyas the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
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bundle as of a piece. According to these scholars, not all the twigs are
equally important or expendable. In particular, to them, the right to exclude
is the core of ownership, indeed the very sine qua non of ownership, and
the bundle metaphor obscures this central point.'0
The leading exponents of this view, which we can call the exclusion
theory, are Professors Thomas Merrill, of Columbia Law School, and
Henry Smith, of Harvard. Writing both separately and together, Merrill and
Smith argue, "[t]he most basic principle is that property at its core entails
the right to exclude others from some discrete thing. This right gives rise to
a general duty on the part of others to abstain from interfering with the
thing." They go on to assert:
The materials [in our Property casebook] are designed to challenge each
student to decide for him or herself whether property is defined by common
principles such as the right to exclude others, or whether any such principle is
so riddled with exceptions that property can only be regarded as an ad hoc
'bundle of rights.' I
Several aspects of this claim need to be noticed. The most important of
these is the claimed centrality of the right to exclude to ownership.
Professors Merrill and Smith argue that the right to exclude is the core of
ownership of property. One of them, Professor Merrill, goes so far as to
assert that this right is the very essence of ownership itself; take that right
away and you no longer have ownership. 12 However true that claim may be
under American law and American society, it is not true of all legal systems
or societies, even in the western world. At best, the claim is only culturally
true; it is culturally contingent. Scotland, for example, has enacted a socalled "right to roam" law, which permits any person to be upon anyone
else's land, subject to certain limitations (such as not coming within a few
yards of a person's home).' 3 One might distinguish the Scottish example
from American law in certain respects. For example, Scotland is not a
common-law country. Instead, it has a mixed legal system, combining the
common law with the civil law. Moreover, the ancient system of feudal

10 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730 (1998);

Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and PropertyRules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REv. 965
(2004); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategiesfor Delineating
PropertyRights, 31 J. OF LEG. STUD. 453 (2002).
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estates was not abolished in Scotland until as late as 2000.14 England,
however, is a common law country par excellence, and it too now has a
right to roam statute.' 5 The English statute differs from its Scottish
predecessor in certain notable respects, the most important of which is that
its coverage is more limited. Under the English Act, the public has the right
to wander only over registered "common land" and lands classified as16
"open country," defined as mountain, moorland, heath and downland.
Qualified land covers approximately twelve percent of England and Wales,
in contrast with the nearly one hundred percent covered by the Scottish
statutory right. 17
Professors Merrill and Smith claim that this exclusion theory captures the
ordinary person's morality of property.' 8 The "traditional everyday view,"
they assert, is that property just is a "right to a thing good against the
world."' 19 But just which ordinary person's morality is this? Apparently not
the ordinary Scot's morality, for the statute recognizing the right to roam
had strong popular support.20 Nor, apparently, does it reflect the ordinary
English person's morality of property. 21 So, the morality, if it be a morality
at all, is neither timeless nor universal. It is, at best, culturally-based; it is
contingent.
Moreover, there is reason to be skeptical that it is the ordinary
American's morality. Perhaps ordinary Americans talk about ownership of
property in these simplistic ways,22 but they surely don't think about
ownership that way, at least not when faced with a situation in which it
makes a difference. 23 In analyzing the ways in which ordinary people
understand ownership of property, the relevant social judgments are not
simply the judgments as to which specific interests people apply the words
"ownership" or "property" in ordinary language usage. Rather, the relevant
14

See Abolition of Feudal Tenure (Scotland) Act 2000(ASP 5) §§ 1-3. It, together with

other Scottish legislation, is available at http://www.scotland-legislation.hmso.gov.uk/
legislation/scotland/about.htm.
15 For a good discussion on the English act, see Jerry L. Anderson, Britain's Right to
Roam: Redefining the Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. Rev. 375 (2007).
16 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, § 1 (Eng.).
17 See Anderson, supra note 15, at 407.
18 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1849, 1894 (2007).
19 Merrill & SMITH, supra note 11, at 1.

20 See Lovett, supra note 13; Gregory S. Alexander, The Sporting Life: The Historical
Origins of the Scottish Right to Roam, 2016 U. Ill. L. Rev.
(2016) (forthcoming).
21 See Lovett, supra note 13, at 301-02.
22 See ACKERMAN, supranote 7.
23 For some empirical evidence indicating the greater complexity of ordinary
people's
thinking regarding ownership and boundaries, see Nicholas Blomley, The Boundaries of
Property, 48 CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER 91 (2004).
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considerations are the shared impressions about the circumstances in which
given interests would be entitled, prima facie, to legal protection against
non-consensual encroachments.
Such expectations are not always
expressed in ordinary speech in terms of "ownership" or "property." Those
terms are perhaps most commonly used in connection with the forms of
wealth that are dominant in the given speaker's social spheres. People may
nevertheless consider other interests, less commonly encountered within
their particular group, prima facie legally protectable whenever they are
threatened or challenged. The boundary between legally protectable and
non-protectable interests in the expectations of well-socialized lay persons
does not always track speech habits concerning the terms "ownership" and
"property., 24 Moreover, why should we suppose that most ordinary folk
regard the right to exclude as the maximal right, the essence of ownership,
as it were? Apparently some people consider the right to use, which might
be seen as the opposite side of the coin from the right to exclude, as equally
important.25
Others consider the power to transfer as essential to
ownership.26
To the extent that it is possible to identify an ordinary American's
morality concerning property at all, that morality seems closer to the
morality that lay behind James Madison's vision for the Fifth Amendment's
property clause that he drafted. As various scholars have observed,2
Madison's aim in proposing that clause was protecting a sphere of
individual autonomy against depredations by the state. It was state action
that was the source of Madison's anxiety, for Madison understood that
individuals are social creatures, embedded in multiple social networks.
Consequently, property itself is social. Abusive behavior by one's
neighbors is one thing; abusive behavior by the state, armed as it is with
vast power, is another. Disputes between neighbors were to be left to the
private arena, negotiation and, hopefully, eventual cooperation, but in
disputes between individuals and the state the status of the individual
property owner had to be raised to a different level in order to enable
property to do its autonomy-protecting work.28 It is this connection
24

See Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional

Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1545, 156061(1982).
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26 See id.
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28 See Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1988).
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between property and individual autonomy that lies at the heart of any
ostensible ordinary conception of property.
Where, then, does this leave us with regard to the debate over
conceptualizing property? My sense is that it leaves us with no single,
universally-applicable or correct conception of property. We need multiple
conceptions of property ownership.2 9 The reason is that no single
conception of property, or ownership, adequately captures all of the diverse
social contexts in which people own property. Property is not solely a
creature of market; it is also an institution of marriage and the family, of
neighborhoods, of community groups, and other social contexts. In some of
these contexts the exclusion conception of ownership fits well, while in
others, some version of the bundles-of-rights conception works much
better. As Hanoch Dagan has argued, with respect to the exclusion
conception:
numerous [property] rules prescribe the rights and obligations of members of
local communities, neighbors, co-owners, partners, and family members,
including.., the governance of these property institutions. These property
rules cannot fairly be analyzed in terms of exclusion or exclusivity: ...
the
whole point of these elaborate property governance doctrines is to provide
structures for
cooperative rather than competitive or hierarchical
30
relationships.

At the same time, Dagan points out, the bundles-of-rights conception,
while capturing part of the picture, is somewhat misleading. 3' As Dagan
puts it, ownership is not "a mere laundry list of rights with limitless
permutations. '' 32 For one thing, under the so-called numerus clausus
doctrine, property law itself imposes limits on the forms that ownership can
take. The bundles-of-rights is not open-ended. Better to think of ownership
as tending to be structured by different assemblages of rights and
obligations according to different contexts. These different assemblages are
not purely ad hoc but tend to be patterned according to certain repeated
domains of social life. Thus, ownership of property in the strictly
commercial sphere usually carries with it a particular bundle of rights and
obligations, whereas ownership within the marital realm has a rather
different configuration of rights and duties. So, for example, both the
classical and exclusion conceptions have greater traction if we are dealing
29 See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 40-43 (2011).
30
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3 DAGAN, supra note
32 Id. at 42.

29, at 41-42.
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with my status as the owner of my laptop computer than they do my status
as owner of a condominium in a residential community. One size does not
fit all.
II. CATEGORIZING PROPERTY
The next theme is categorizing property. Here again, I am going to
examine this theme in a somewhat unconventional fashion. In referring to
categories, one might suppose that my topic will be property law's internal
categorical structure of estates, servitudes, and other such interests. Instead,
I am going to address the familiar public/private categorical distinction, but
not in the way that the distinction is usually discussed. Rather than
addressing the question of which aspects of property law are a matter of
private law and which are public law, I am going to talk about the more
fundamental question of property law's basic values, the values that support
property law, and whether those values properly belong to the private or the
public realm.
We commonly associate property with certain private law values. Those
values include individual autonomy, personal security/privacy, selfdetermination, self-expression, and responsibility (along with other virtues).
These values, the values that theorists take to be among the intended ends
of private property, are not in conflict or incompatible with fundamental
public values, values such as equality, inclusiveness, community, and
participation. Quite the contrary, the private law values at times require
recognition of public values for property's own values to be realized. That
is, they are internal to private law and are constitutive of its ends. The
relationship between private property and public values should be seen as
symbiotic rather than antagonistic.
Just what does it mean to say that fulfillment of a traditional private law
end requires one or more conventional public values? Consider first the
private law value of individual autonomy. Every major liberal theory of
property gives special place to autonomy as a justification for private
property rights. Two theories--Kantianism and libertarianism--identify it as
property's foundational end. Even utilitarianism and its modem variant,
welfarism, indirectly recognize the special contribution of personal
autonomy to overall social well-being, whether defined in terms of utility or
wealth. No one would dispute that autonomy is at least a component of
property's ends. But autonomy is not self-realizing. We are not born as
autonomous agents. We depend upon others to help us develop those
capabilities that enable us to function as independent practical reasoners.
As Alasdair Maclntyre states, "To become an effective independent
practical reasoner is an achievement, but it is always one to which others
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have made essential contributions."3 3 We enter the world utterly dependent
on others for our physical survival, but our dependence on others doesn't
end with infancy or even with childhood. Even upon reaching adulthood,
we continue to place at least partial physical dependence (and even
emotional or psychological dependence) on others as we move through a
dangerous world. Often, little more than dumb luck separates the
independent adult from the dependent one. And, as we reach the final years
of our lives, the possibility of physical dependence once again looms ever
larger.
Our dependence on others to develop autonomy goes beyond sheer
physical dependence. MacIntyre observes:
What we need from others, if we are ... to develop the capacities of

independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for
fostering the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical
judgments, to ask, that is, whether what we take to be good reasons for action
really are sufficiently good reasons, and the ability to imagine realistically
alternative possible futures, so as to be able to make rational choices between
them, and the ability to stand back from our desires, so as to be able to
enquire rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires and
how our desires must be directed and, if necessary, reeducated, if we are to
attain

it.34

This kind of nurturing and this sort of capability development is carried
out through communities, through networks of family members, friends,
teachers, and others who constitute the multiple social spheres of our lives.
Individual autonomy can be acquired only within a vital matrix of social
structures and practices. Its continued existence and exercise depends upon
a richly social, cultural, and institutional context, and the free and
autonomous individual must rely upon others to provide this context.
The interdependence between private and public values in the context of
property law can be illustrated by several cases. Consider the well-known
right-to-exclude case, Jacque v. Steenherg Homes, Inc.

In that case, home

owners, Lois and Harvey Jacque, sued Steenberg Homes for damages for
intentional trespass to the Jacques' land.36 Steenberg delivered a mobile
home by plowing a path across the Jacques' snow-covered field despite
strenuous protests from the Jacques.3 Although other means of accessing
the delivery location were available, Steenberg used the path across the
33 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS:
THE VIRTUES
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563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
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37 Id.

WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED
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Jacques' land because that was the easiest route for it. The jury awarded
the Jacques one dollar in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive
damages. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that if a jury
awards nominal damages for intentional trespass, the jury may also award
punitive damages. The Jacques had good autonomy-based reasons for
excluding Steenberg Homes. If home-dwellers are to feel secure in their
own homes and to be uncoerced in making decisions regarding what uses of
their land will make their lives go best for them, they must be free of
intentional trespass. There are exceptional situations, of course, such as the
need for police or fire fighters to access a person's home in case of
emergency, but the owner is not likely to object to entrance upon her
property under such circumstances.
Contrast Jacque with the famous Civil Rights Era "Lunch Counter"
cases." In those cases, young African Americans were arrested for and
convicted of criminal trespass when they refused to leave restaurants after
being requested to do so solely because of their race. The alleged
trespassers, who were protesting "whites-only" practices at lunch counters
in Southern retail stores, had asked to be served lunch but were refused and
were asked to leave. The defendants appealed their convictions arguing
that the convictions violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases raised the question whether state
action was involved or whether the discrimination was strictly private. In
each case the Court found state action.
Would such cases be decided differently under the common law? Would
they be viewed the same as Jacque, with the restaurant owner having the
right to exclude anyone for whatever reason? Although there certainly are
older decisions that indicate otherwise,3 9 I suggest that it would be possible
for a court to hold that a restaurant owner does not have the right to exclude
for racially discriminatory reasons (or other reasons based on grounds of
invidious discrimination) under the private law of property. The public
values that nurture property's private values push against the freedom of
owners of restaurants that are otherwise open to the public to exclude
members of the owners' communities because of their race. Because the
owners have otherwise opened their restaurants to the general public, the
owner's personal security is not at stake in this situation. Admitting
African American patrons in no way adds to the risk of the owners' security
beyond the level of risk that the owners have already voluntarily accepted.
38

See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964);

Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, S.C., 373 U.S.
244 (1963).
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More fundamentally, the public value of self-constitution, which is
necessary for personal autonomy, resists recognition of the owners' right to
exclude under these circumstances. I said earlier that self-constitution -- the
process of interpreting oneself within a social context -- is always dialogical
in character. I also said that self-constitution's social dimension poses a
risk of undermining rather than promoting personal autonomy and that the
purpose of the right to exclude is to mitigate that risk. Where the
interaction between the owner and others is already in a social and public
setting, one that the owner has created, the owner has already assumed that
risk by creating the setting. In that situation, the right to exclude cannot
perform its risk-mitigation function. Requiring that the owner admit to his
restaurant patrons who he would otherwise admit but for their race does not
undermine his personal autonomy in any meaningful sense. He has already
made choices about his goals with respect to the use of his property, choices
that are immediately relevant to his right to exclude in this circumstance.
Hence, it is quite arguable that the public accommodation cases such as
these could have been decided the same way as they were on private law
grounds as by relying on constitutional or statutory provisions.40
Consider another example. Most, perhaps all, of us are familiar with
common interest communities, also known as homeowner association. The
relations between common interest communities, called CICs for short, and
their members often are friendly and cooperative, but sometimes
enforcement of restrictive covenants create bad blood between CICs, which
are created to enforce these rules, and the owners who are subject to them.
Consider the case of Donald Lamp. He was the father-in-law of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. He got into a dispute with the
governing board of his condo association several years back when he hung
an American flag from the balcony of his Omaha, Nebraska apartment on a
particular July 4t'morning, a ritual he had observed every year. Citing a
violation of one of the covenants in the master plan that governs the
development, the condo association board told him to remove the flag, but
Mr. Lamp, a World War II veteran, would have none of it.
Lamp's case got national attention, much of it unfavorable for the
homeowner association. A typical reaction was this posting on a blog site:
"Donald Lamp fought for our right and his right to display our nation's flag
anywhere and anytime. ,41

40

Gregory S. Alexander, Property'sEnds: The Publicness of PrivateLaw Values, 99

IOWA L. REv. 1257, 1291 (2014); Cf Note, The AntidiscriminationPrinciple in the Common
Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1993 (1989).
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The question, of course, is, does Mr. Lamp have such a right? On one view, a
view informed by the private law values of property law, the answer, quite
clearly, is no.

The covenant restricting the display of flags within the

development was included in Mr. Lamp's deed. He had legal notice, either
actual or record notice, of it at the time he entered into the purchase of his
unit, and he agreed to be bound to it. The matter is strictly one of consent. So
long as he had notice of the restrictive covenant at the time he entered into the
agreement with the association, he is bound by it. Donald Lamp and his
supporters did not see the matter this way. To them, some values cannot be
contracted away. These are fundamental values--public values--and among
them is the right to display the American flag. So the argument goes.42
What private and public values are at stake in this dispute? At one level,
disputes such as Donald Lamp's seem easily resolved by looking at the
matter through the lens of personal responsibility with its concomitant legal
principle of contractual obligation. Lamp signed an agreement expressly
restricting his freedom to display flags publicly, and he is responsible for
that contractual commitment. Yet if we examine the matter a bit more
deeply, it becomes apparent that personal responsibility does not exhaust
the list of private law values that are at stake in Lamp's dispute. For
personal autonomy seems just as obviously involved in the controversy.
Personal autonomy means being the creator of one's own ideas and
preferences.
To be sure, it does not mean being immune from all
involvement by others in one's affairs; that is an impossible situation. But
it does mean that one's plans, ideas, beliefs, and so on, are one's own, and
not coerced by others.
One can certainly point out that, by signing the deed that included the
restrictive covenant, Mr. Lamp freely chose to restrict his own autonomy
with respect to displaying flags outside his apartment.
From that
perspective, personal responsibility trumps any view of personal autonomy
that suggests tension between the two values in this case. Yet closely
related to personal autonomy in this situation is yet another value--selfexpression. Sometimes it is not enough simply to hold views that are the
creations of one's own making; one feels compelled to express those views.
On these occasions self-expression supports, and even extends, personal
autonomy. Lamp held deeply personal beliefs and chose to use his position
as homeowner to express those beliefs publicly. The American flag
symbolized beliefs that Lamp considered expressive of his identity, and he
wished to communicate those beliefs with his neighbors in a particularly
prominent and effective way. Self-expression is an important value that
does not merely augment autonomy, but also enables the exercise of

42
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autonomy. From that perspective, autonomy alone cannot justify Lamp's
waiver of self-expression.
One possible basis for justifying waiver is freedom of association.
Homeowner associations, like other voluntary associations, rely on freedom
of association for their integrity and, ultimately, their existence. If we lack
the freedom not only to choose the persons with whom we associate, but
also the ground rules by which our association abides, we cannot truly
realize our social character.
The connection between freedom of association and human sociability
suggests that freedom of association implicates a deeper value--community.
Conceptually, community is relevant here as a value, a regulative ideal, and
as a sociological phenomenon. 43 As a regulative ideal, community operates
as a norm by which relationships may be regulated and something that we
experience in our actual lives. Community is also a sociological concept.
In this sense it describes a group mode of living and social interaction with
others with whom we share particular interests and values. Homeowner
associations are frequently identified as communities in this latter,
sociological sense. Common interest developments often stress the clublike quality of their living experience, explicitly emphasizing their grouplike character.44
Community has both private and public aspects. It is private in the sense
that it is constitutive of the self. Community's public side regulates the
external relations of communities as institutions, that is, their relations with
each other, especially the larger communities of which it is a part. The
most important of these larger communities is the state, for the state
facilitates these smaller communities through its rules of private ordering
and fundamental norms respecting rights of association, assembly, and the
like.
The general point is that the categories of public and private are
unhelpful with respect to community. The line between them is as porous
as it is with respect to all of the values underlying property. Both
institutionally and normatively, community operates in a Janus-faced
fashion, always looking inward to itself and yet outward to the increasingly
larger spheres of social life with which it is inextricably enmeshed.
This double life of community is essential to a proper understanding of
community's role as a value, or end, of property.
It means that
community's normative valence is not always clear.
When other
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
AND COMMUNITY, at xxviii, xxix (Gregory S. Alexander and Eduardo M. Pefialver eds.,
2010).
44 Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9-12 (1989).
43
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substantive values of small institutional communities conflict with those of
one or more of the larger institutional communities within which the
smaller communities are nested, the normative implication of community
does not unambiguously favor one substantive value or the other. There is
no trumping effect of community as a value. What matters in these
situations of nested communities with conflicting substantive values is the
nature of the relationship between the institutional communities.
The private side of community poses a risk of undermining rather than
promoting personal autonomy. The core of community's private side is
autonomy, the value that supports the power of communities, as
institutions, to exclude those who do not share the constituent values and
interests of particular communities. That value --autonomy-- confers upon
communities power to set the terms and conditions of membership in
voluntary communities, requiring members to subordinate their own
personal autonomy for the good of the larger institution's values.
The public side of community, as a private law value, places a limit on
this subordination of personal autonomy and supports autonomy as one of
property's ends by striking a balance between personal and institutional
autonomy. The basis for this limit is the fact that the state, as the
community that enables the creation of voluntary communities through its
private legal rules of contract and constitutional rights of assembly and free
association, and facilitates the operation of those communities through its
legal system, is literally constitutive of them.
As the foundational
community that makes the existence of smaller, nested communities
possible, the state sets the basic parameters for their membership within the
foundational, constitutive community. Those parameters are set by the
state's own foundational values, the values of which it is normatively
constituted.
Among these foundational values is personal autonomy,
augmented by its ancillary value of self-expression. These values are
constitutive of the state as a political community. Self-expression, which is
manifested, among other ways, in the right of freedom of speech, is
essential to the existence of a particular kind of political community, and
for that reason the state treats it as fundamental. Because self-expression is
so existential, it cannot be subordinated to conflicting values of smaller
voluntary communities. This is not a matter of state action or public law.
The priority of the state's fundamental values, values such as personal
autonomy and self-expression, over the values of nested voluntary
communities, is established by private law, through its values.
In cases such as Mr. Lamp's, the public side of community as a private
law value resists recognition of the right of voluntary groups, including
those created by private agreement, to subordinate values that are
existential to the particular kind of political community that the state
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represents to the group's own conflicting values. Hence, the question
whether Lamp waived his right to display the American flag in front of his
condominium unit is moot because, properly understood, the private law of
property makes the value of self-expression non-waivable as applied to
such forms of self-expression as political speech.45
Of course, there are limits to this principle of subordination. It applies
only to those values that are truly existential to the particular kind of
political community that the state represents. Hence, in the case of
homeowner associations, not all instances of self-expression or other acts of
personal autonomy are or should be beyond the group's power to regulate.
So, for example, a homeowner association covenant prohibiting outdoor
displays of plastic pink flamingoes is valid. Such an aesthetic regulation,
although restricting self-expression, in no way implicates values that are
existential to the substantive character of the larger political community.
The same will be true of the vast majority of homeowner association rules.
Group autonomy, which promotes the integrally related values of free
association and sociability, should normally prevail because it is supported
by community's private aspect and does not interfere with its public
dimension.
The relationship between the public and private often turns out to be
supportive rather than in conflict. The values that are part of property's
public dimension in many instances are necessary to support, facilitate, and
enable property's private ends. Hence, any account of public and private
values that depicts them as categorically separate is seriously misleading.
III. HISTORICIZING PROPERTY

The third theme is historicizing property. More than all of the other firstyear law school courses, perhaps, Property is strongly influenced by
history. As the preface to an old Property casebook states, "[M]uch of the
modem law of Property is understandable only in light of its origins and
development and ...only through a knowledge of the historical factors can
law students
get an intelligent understanding of the evolution of the
46
institution.'
45 This is essentially the position adopted inthe Restatement (Third) of Property. See

Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.1 (2000).
American flag, the primacy of the individual's autonomy is
See 4 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) ("A condominium association...
policy ...that would restrict or prevent a member of the
flag of the United States on residential property").

As to the specific issue of the
now codified by federal statute.
may not adopt or enforce any
association from displaying the

46 1 RALPH AIGLER, ALLEN SMITH & SHELDON TEFFT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF PROPERTY, at vii

(2d ed. 1951).
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Virtually all of the Property casebooks, including my own, depict
property's evolution as linear. This view of property law's history is
entirely unsurprising, for it squares neatly with a larger view of the
historical development of property. With only a few exceptions, historians
and political theorists, along with legal scholars, have tended to accept
uncritically the claim that there is a single tradition of property that runs
throughout American history and American historical thought. According
to this view, property has served one core purpose and has had a single
constant meaning throughout American history: to define in material terms
the legal and political sphere within which individuals are free to pursue
their own private agendas and satisfy their own preferences, free from
governmental coercion or other forms of external interference. Property,
according to this line of thought, is the foundation for the categorical
separation between the public and private spheres of life, the individual and
the collective, the market and the polity.
The economic expression of this individual preference-satisfying
conception of property is market commodity. Property satisfies individual
preferences most effectively through the process of market exchange, or
what lawyers call market-alienability. The exchange function of property is
so important in American society property is often thought to be
synonymous with the idea of market commodity.
This commodity view of property is only half right. Property-ascommodity is one-half of a dialectic that American legal thought and legal
writing has continuously expressed from the nation's very beginning to the
present. The other half of the dialectic is a view that I call property as
propriety.4 According to the propriety view, property is the material
foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social order, the private
basis for the public good. This proprietarian tradition, whose roots are very
old indeed, has always understood the individual as an inherently social
being, inevitably dependent upon others not only to thrive but just to
survive. The irreducible interdependency means that individuals owe one
another obligations, not by virtue of consent alone but as an inherent
incident of the human condition. This view of human nature provides the
basis for the political-legal principle in proprietarian thought that when
individuals fail to meet their precontractual social obligations, the state may
legitimately compel them to act for the good of the entire community.
The concept of the common weal, moreover, was understood to have
substantive meaning. The common law maxim salus populi suprema est

47 Id. (citing Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 J. OF THE

Am. Soc'Y FOR LEGAL AND POL. PHIL. 223, 223-47(1991)).
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lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) had real content. 48 The
public good was not understood as simply whatever the market produces,
for the market was viewed as a realm in which individuals were too
vulnerable to the temptation to act out of narrow self-interest rather than, as
proprietarian principles required, for the purpose of maintaining the
properly ordered society.
Just what the proper social order is has been an enormously controversial
issue throughout American history. The existence of different substantive
conceptions of the properly ordered society means that there have been
multiple versions of the proprietarian conception of property in American
legal history. To illustrate, let me quickly sketch three such conceptions of
property that fit within the proprietarian definition but whose substantive
terms differ greatly from each other.
The first example is the civic republican conception of property, most
eloquently and forcefully championed by Thomas Jefferson. Contrary to
some popular misconceptions, Jefferson's understanding of property was
not grounded on individual liberty, at least not for its own sake. Jefferson
was no Lockean. Unlike Locke, Jefferson thought that law creates property
rights and that law ought continually to control them.
Jefferson believed that every citizen-remember that citizenship was
confined to white males-ought to own land and own it in fee simple. The
republic was constituted by nothing less than the "fee simple empire."
Citizens were men who cultivated-they owned freely; so positioned, they
were beholden to no one and were independent in the most literal sense.
This form of independence was necessary for them to act virtuously, free of
corruption, strictly in the interest of the common good.
The form of property that Jefferson opposed, the form of property that he
found threatening to the virtuous republic, was not just commercial
property, but industrial property. The opposition, then, was between
agricultural property and industrial property, i.e., cultivation of the land and
manufacturing. "Those who labor in the earth," he stated, were the "chosen
people of God.",49 They held this exalted status insofar as they were not
exposed to the corrupting influence of manufacturing. "As '[d]ependence
begets subservience,' he continued, manufacturing begets dependence."
Jefferson's concern with dependence led him to oppose aspects of the
English system of inheritance that perpetuated hierarchy and dependence.
Notable among these aspects were primogeniture and the fee tail. Under
48
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the doctrine of primogeniture, when a man died intestate (without a legally
valid will) his lands descended to his eldest son. Primogeniture could be
avoided by devising one's land by will, as most wealthy eighteenth-century
American landowners did. But the symbolic significance of primogeniture
alone was enough to draw republican opposition.
Republicans similarly opposed entailments of land, which involved
keeping land within the family by restricting the power of the person to
whom a testator might devise land to transfer it outside the line of lineal
descendants. Through this arrangement land would pass through a series of
descendants, one generation to the next, possibly for hundreds of years.
Such an arrangement sapped citizens of their independence, republicans
believed.
Under Jefferson's leadership, Virginia enacted legislation
abolishing both primogeniture and the fee tail. Virginia's example was
quickly followed in other colonies, pursuing the same vision of republican
property.
The next example of property-as-propriety comes from the antebellum
South. Southern slavery theory was primarily a social theory. 50 The major
theorists, including legal theorists, who defended slavery did so did so on
the basis of a coherent, albeit utterly immoral, theory of the ideal society
whose core institution was chattel slavery. That ideal society was in many
ways pre-modern and in many ways the antithesis of the modem society
they saw developing in the North. Pro-slavery theorists identified the
modem society by three characteristics that were anathema to them: (1)
social leveling, that is, the decline of a natural social hierarchy; (2) the
decline of internal, that is, nonconsensual social obligations; and (3) the
alienation of labor from capital. Modem society was characterized by
fluidity in all aspects of social life.
Pro-slavery legal theory, particularly after 1840, was in many respects
hostile to the classical economic teachings of Adam Smith and David
Ricardo. These Southern slavery theorists constructed a world order that
was an alternative to social modernity, as they understood it. What made
modernity unacceptable for them was that it seemingly meant the market's
total domination over all social relations. 51
"The Southern theorists' ideal society was certainly a market society in
the sense that the market allocated economic resources." What set their
ideal society apart from modem society was the fact that the market's
influence on social life was strictly limited. Above all, these Southern
defenders of slavery insisted, the market could not be permitted to

5o Id. at 214.
51 Id. at 213.
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destabilize the South's rigid social hierarchy, which they considered to be
organic, moral, and proper. 52
The foundation for the new social order that the Southern theorists
imagined was, of course, the South's "peculiar institution."53 More
precisely, the foundation was the conception of slaves as a unique form of
property. Though they could be used as a commodity, slaves were not
primarily valued for that function. Their core function, rather, was to
anchor and maintain the stability of the proper social hierarchy. It was the
preservation of that hierarchy, not the production of wealth, that was the
vital interest of the slaves-as-property system.
Within this social vision the commodity conception of property was
highly problematic. The commodity conception was the product of a
modem commercial social order that was in many ways the antithesis of
what proslavery theorists valued. Slave property, used primarily as an item
of commerce, threatened to transform the Southern social order into the
fluid sort
of society that existed in the bourgeois communities of the
54

North.

The South's order required stability at all costs, the slavery theorists
thought, so that the hierarchy that was the very heart of the proper social
order could be preserved.
The key to maintaining that hierarchy was keeping a strict distinction
between property that was fungible, that is, market property, and property
that is not fungible because its primary function is civic, not economic. In
the center of this non-fungible property stood the slave. The slave was to
mid-nineteenth century Southern theorists what land was to eighteenthcentury century civic republicans, the anchor of virtuous citizenship.
Although land was clearly superior to intangible forms of property (such as
credit) in the Southern hierarchy of property, it was nevertheless inferior in
importance to slaves.
Still, land and slaves were different in respects that were relevant to the
Southern theorists. Primarily, the difference for their purposes is that land
is immobile but slaves are not.
The shift from immobile land to mobile slaves as the primary form of
economic

attachment... threatened

to transform

the

South

from a

traditional society in which property owners are civically, as well as
physically, unconnected. In this latter sort of society citizens are less
citizens than they are autonomous, preference-maximizing agents, precisely
the

sort

of homo
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North... described with admiration but that [Southern theorists] viewed
with anxiety. As [one Southern writer] put it, "It is useless to seek to excite
patriotic emotion in behalf of the land of birth, when self-interest speaks so
loudly."55
The pro-slavery theorists' unwillingness to abolish the market left them
with a dilemma of which they were aware. Their writings frequently
reflected a sense of uncertainty about the future of slavery. The only way
in which they could cover up their unease was to pull out the old wretched
racist rhetoric on which time and again they relied. In the end their socalled republic was doomed.
The final example of property-as-propriety comes from the rise of the
modem welfare state, especially during the post-War period. "Welfarism as
a state policy fundamentally changed private property, both as a social
institution and as a legal concept. As an institution, property in the welfare
state was 56
more obviously public than it had been throughout the nineteenth
century."
Housing is a particularly striking example of how the regulatory state
became more involved in seemingly private relations. The relationship
between landlords and their tenants, which traditionally was subject to
minimal legal regulation, underwent a massive legal change during the
1960s. Federal legislation like the Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited
discrimination in the private housing market on the basis of race, religion,
gender, and national origin. At the state level, many states, prompted by
court decisions, enacted statutes creating a "warranty of habitability" that
guaranteed tenants the right to live in safe and habitable conditions. These
statutes reversed the traditional legal rule that allocated to tenants the
responsibility for care and condition of rental housing. The most important
aspect of this new warranty was that it was non-waivable; landlords and
tenants could not bargain around the new warranty even if they were so
inclined. The overall effect of these and other changes was substantially to
remove landlord-tenant relations, especially in the residential context,
from
57
the realm of private ordering to the domain of public regulation.
The welfare state changed ideas about property as much as it did the
institution of property. The most important effect of social welfare
programs on legal thought about property was that they undermined the
commodity conception in some areas of social life.
Various types of property [that] traditionally were regarded as market
assets came to be seen as serving other, non-market functions. On those
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occasions when free market transferability seemed to threaten these
functions, the law changed to protect the non-commodified aspects of
property arrangements.
Landlord-tenant law again provides a clear example. The "revolution,"
as it has been called, in the law regulating landlord-tenant relations was
based on the implicit premise that residential housing should not be treated
solely as a market asset, subject to being bought and sold on whatever terms
the parties wanted. At least as important as the economic function is a
political-moral function: residential housing is one of the crucial material
conditions that determine whether and how people will flourish personally
and as citizens. Courts and legal scholars explained the legal changes
creating new rights for tenants as based on a shift from antiquated feudal
property law to contract law, but that account was very misleading. The
new rules establishing tenants' rights were not entirely consistent with
contract law and certainly not contractarian in the sense of reflecting a
commitment to private ordering. The real basis for the overall doctrinal
shift was a change in how the legal culture perceived the character of
residential housing.
While the landlord's interest ... is (usually) strictly financial- a
commodity-the tenant's interest is primarily personal and only
secondarily financial. Tenants enter into a lease primarily to have a home,
a place in which to belong, not as an investment. Protecting that personal
interest means treating it as at least somewhat outside the domain of market
ordering, in which the rights and duties of the two sides are set through the
process of bargaining. The new landlord-tenant rule replaced bargaining
with legally-imposed terms regulating the relationship precisely to protect
the tenant's non-commodity interest from the possibly corrosive effects of
the market.58
As this quick survey hopefully reveals, the market conception - the
commodity conception - although it remains the dominant conception, is
not the only available way of thinking about property. The propriety
conception remains alive and well, perhaps even thriving, at least in some
areas of law and social life. In this respect, historically, then, nothing has
changed. American legal thought is and has always been characterized by a
dualism in ways of conceiving property.

58 Id. at 361-62; see Gregory S. Alexander, Property as Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REv. 667,
688 (2014).
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IV. ENFORCING PROPERTY
The fourth theme should be familiar to all law students. I call this theme
"enforcing property," and it has to do with the distinction between rules and
standards. Rules and standards are legal norms through which law enforces
property duties and protect property rights. As we all know, the distinction
between them is that rules are hard-edged, clear, predictable, and easily
understood and applied. Standards, on the other hand, are more openended, vaguer or opaque, less predictable. The conventional wisdom is that
property law is and ought to be by and large the domain of rules, or
"crystals," as one scholar calls them,5 9 with only the occasion use of
standards, or "mud." 60 Property law, more than tort law and even more
than contract, the argument goes, requires predictability, and predictability
is possible only in a regime of clear-cut rules.6' I want to suggest that this
wisdom is quite misleading, that, as a descriptive matter, property law has
shifted substantially toward the use of standards over the past quarter of a
century and that standards and predictability are not necessarily
incompatible.
Professor Joseph Singer has recently written an article showing that
property law seems to be moving away from clear rules and toward flexible
rules.62 Over the past few decades, Singer shows, both courts and
legislatures have increasingly discarded traditional hard-edged rules and
adopted in their place standards of various sorts.63 As Singer puts it,
"Reasonableness tests now abound in property law.",
One area of property law that illustrates this trend is servitude law, the
province of easements and covenants. Traditionally, this was an area that
was governed by rules. For real covenants to run with the land, as we
lawyers say, horizontal privity of estate had to exist between the original
parties to the covenant,64 and the covenant could be enforced against
someone who was not the original promisor only if vertical privity existed
between that party and the defendant. 65 The list of technical rules such as
these has bewildered law students for generations.

59 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988).
60
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61 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1719,
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62 See Singer, supra note 60, at 1372-73.
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Another traditional rule of servitude law is the requirement that a real
66
covenant or an equitable servitude must "touch and concern" the land.
This rule illustrates one of the problems with rules. Some legal norms that
are nominally rules turn out to be standards in practice. That is, they
exhibit the same characteristics that we commonly attribute to standards;
they are opaque, open-ended, and unpredictable. Precisely in reaction to
this problem with the touch-and-concern requirement, modem servitude
law has shifted from a nominal rule approach to an explicitly standardbased approach. The Restatement (Third) of Servitudes has abandoned the
touch-and-concern requirement and substituted in its place a policy-focus
standard. Under the new Restatement a covenant is invalid if it is "illegal
or unconstitutional or [against] public policy."' 67 It is the last ground of
invalidity-of course, against public policy-that is the standard. The
Restatement does provide some guidelines regarding what factors might
lead to offenses of public policy, among them servitudes burdening a
"fundamental constitutional right" and servitudes that are spiteful or
capricious, but the boundaries of these factors are hardly hard-edged.
Another example is the case of the "improving trespasser., 68 This case
occurs when someone constructs an improvement, say, a garage, on what
she thinks is her own land but because of some error (maybe by the
surveyor) it really is on her neighbor's land. Traditionally, property law
treated this as a trespass, pure and simple. The trespasser's only remedy
was to try to reach an agreement with her neighbor to allow her to leave her
improvement as is in return, say, for some payment. If the neighbor
refused, the neighbor had a clear right to force the trespasser to remove the
improvement, regardless of the cost and regardless of its importance to the
trespasser. Even if the intrusion was minimal, the victim could compel
removal at the trespasser's expense. The trespasser's innocence and good
faith were entirely irrelevant. Most courts today have abandoned this clear
rule in favor or a murkier "relative hardship" standard. 69 Under this
standard the court, rather than summarily ordering removal of the
improvement, will order a forced sale of the land on which the
improvement sits to the improving trespasser if several conditions are met:
(1) the improvement was constructed in a good faith belief that the
trespasser is constructing on her own land; (2) the encroachment is small, or
relatively so; and (3) the cost of removing the improvement is large.
However, if the encroachment was constructed in bad faith, that is, with the
66
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knowledge that it was on the neighbor's land, the court will revert to the old
rule and order removal.
The pattern of shifting from traditional hard-and-fast rules toward more
open-ended standards seems clear enough. This pattern raises the question
whether the trend is wise. Are the values that are commonly associated
with rules, i.e., predictability and ease of application, being sacrificed for
some other values? To consider this question let us return to the right to
exclude, which we discussed earlier. In recent years courts have weakened
the right to exclude through various standards that transform acts that
would otherwise have constituted trespass into permissible encroachments
upon private property. A famous example is State v. Shack. In that case
the defendants entered upon the plaintiff's land for the purpose of providing
aid, specifically, health care and legal advice, to migrant farm workers who
worked for the plaintiff and lived on his farm. The plaintiff-owner ordered
them to leave, and after they refused, the plaintiff executed a complaint
against them, charging trespass. The defendants were convicted of criminal
trespass.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, finding that no trespass had occurred. "Title to real property
cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to
come upon the premise," the Court stated. 7 1 "It is unthinkable," the Court
continued, "that the farmer-employer can assert a right to isolate the
72
migrant worker in any respect significant for the worker's well-being."
Hence, "the migrant worker must be allowed to receive visitors [upon the
employer's farm] of his own choice, so long as there is no behavior hurtful
to others. . ... 7 The question for my purposes is whether the case, creating
an exception to the owner's right to exclude through the use of a standard,
renders trespass law in New Jersey unpredictable. The answer, I think, is
no.
Viewed in the context of New Jersey right-to-exclude case law, Shack
fits within an identifiable pattern that provides a degree of regularity, if not
a strict rule, to New Jersey's right-to-exclude decisions. In State v.
Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that under the state's
constitution, individuals have a free speech right to distribute political
leaflets on the Princeton University campus by virtue of the fact that the
university, though private, invited numerous public uses of its resources in
order to fulfill its broader educational ideals and goals. In Uston v. Resorts
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InternationalHotel, Inc., 7 the court restricted a casino owner's right to
exclude a patron, a notorious card-counter in blackjack, stressing the same
factor, namely, "the more private property is devoted to public use, the
more it must accommodate the rights which inhere in individual members
of the general public who use that property.",7 6 Although this norm is
certainly a standard, rather than a binary, on-off rule, it is certainly not at
the open-ended, ad hoc end of the scale where Smith put it. Under Shack
and its cognate New Jersey right-to-exclude decisions, an owner's right to
exclude is very much alive and well, and the limits on that right are
reasonably predictable. Finally, in New Jersey Coalition Against War in
the Middle East v. J.MB. Realty Corp., 7 7 the same court held that this free
speech right extended to protestors against the first Gulf War who were
distributing leaflets in the "public" areas of shopping malls. The case
involved a group that opposed military intervention in the Persian Gulf.
They sought permission to enter a shopping mall for the purpose of
distributing leaflets and were denied entry. The shopping mall permitted
and encouraged non-shopping activities on its premises, including access
for community groups, speech, politics and community issues. The Court
stated that the shopping mall had impliedly made an invitation to leaflet
under these circumstances. Shopping malls intentionally draw people in
and encourage public use of their space. This diminishes their private
78
property interest.
What the New Jersey Supreme Court has done in these cases is to create
a kind of sliding scale approach to the right to exclude. The right to
exclude does not operate in a binary, on/off fashion, but rather is a matter of
degree. Its strength depends upon several factors, including how private the
owner's property is. The more the owner opens her property to the general
public for their own private interests, the less they are able to exclude
people for whatever reason they wish.
This sliding scale approach is precisely the sort of seemingly ad hoc and
indeterminate approach that advocates of rules deplore. In their view it
sacrifices all predictability. But a close look at the New Jersey approach
reveals that this is not so. Elsewhere, 7 9 Dean Eduardo Pefialver and I have
created a graph that plots the outcomes of various New Jersey exclusion
cases along two axes.' ° "The horizontal axis reflects the degree to which
75 445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982).
76 Id. at 376 (quoting Schmid, 423 A.2d at 629).
77 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
78 Id. at 780.
79

See

GREGORY

S.

ALEXANDER

PROPERTY THEORY 142 (2012).
80 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER &

&

EDUARDO M. PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO

EDUARDO

M.

PENALVER, PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY

University ofHawai 'i Law Review / Vol. 38:1

the owner has invited the owner onto her property."'" Using the New
Jersey approach we can view this variable as inversely related to the
objective weight of the owner's interest in being able to exclude those
seeking entry to the owner's property without her permission. The vertical
axis represents the importance of the values (which is not the same as the
intensity of the preferences) that would be vindicated by granting the
entrant access to the property. Plotting the cases out on the basis of these
two axes, a rather clear pattern emerges. Although not based on a
mechanical application of any single rule, the New Jersey Court's approach
comes to be seen as a mix of rules and standards interacting in an
intelligible way that avoids the high degree of uncertainty that rule
advocates predict will result from just this sort of approach to enforcing
property. Standards do not, at least not always, give rise to unpredictability.
Moreover, the converse is also the case; that is, clear rules do not always
promote predictability.
Joseph Singer points out how the subprime housing
82
crisis illustrates this.
The securitization of subprime mortgages occurred within the context of
a regime of fairly clear rules. Property law requires that parties to real
estate transactions reduce their agreement to a signed writing and further
that the paperwork be recorded in the local deed registration office. Banks
as lending institutions did not always follow these rules, however. Many
bypassed the public recording office, thus keeping mortgage information
private, and many also failed to formalize all their mortgage transactions in
the securitization process.83 The result, as Singer observes, is clouded titles
and insecure property rights.84

The two points that emerge from this discussion are that, first, property
law is no longer solely, even mainly, the domain of rules; standards now
proliferate the doctrinal landscape. Second, there is no necessary reason to
believe that this movement from rules to standards has led to a loss of
predictability or stability in property law. Rules are not always as crystalclear as they are sometimes claimed to be, and standards, in practice, often
lead to predictable patterns.

142 (2010).
81 Id.
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See Singer, supra note 60, at 1372.
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V. DE-MARGINALIZ1NG PROPERTY
The final theme is a development that I call "de-marginalizing
property.""5 As that neologism may suggest, the development concerns the
status of socially and economically marginalized groups. Within the past
several decades property law has changed in ways designed to improve the
lives of members of these groups to "de-marginalize" them, as it were. Demarginalizing property is a form of property designed to create a robustly
democratic society, in which democracy is defined not simply by political
rights but by social and economic rights as well. Another term for it might
be "inclusionary property." Although de-marginalizing property has had
some successes, it has a long way to go. There are multiple reasons for the
shortfalls in this effort to improve the status of members of marginalized
groups as fully sharing members of American society through property law.
In this last part of my talk I want to briefly touch on its successes but also
focus on its shortcomings. I will conclude with some remarks about demarginalizing property's deepest challenge.
De-marginalizing property represents a signal break from property law's
roots in private ordering. Its most common and obvious forms have been
legislative interventions that have the effect, if not the purpose, of cutting
back, to one degree or another, on individual freedom to use, possess, or
transfer property. A clear and, for the most part, successful example is the
federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, since amended several times to broaden
its coverage. 86 The Act bans various acts of discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing on the basis of race, religion, sex, familial status, national
origin, or handicap.8 It is difficult, for obvious reasons, to get an accurate
read on the actual prevalence of housing discrimination today.88 Few
individuals who engage in acts of discrimination are likely to acknowledge
their conduct. Moreover, discrimination sometimes comes in subtler forms,
such as individuals who are protected by the Act being steered away from
certain neighborhoods or not shown certain units that are otherwise
available. The current method of measuring discrimination today is
through the use of testers. Two testers are sent out to housing providers,
agents, and lenders with identical fictitious backgrounds, with one
85 For an incomparable analysis of property law, primarily, but not exclusively, South

Africa's, from a marginal perspective, see A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS
(2009). Professor van der Walt defines marginal persons and groups as "those suffered
under the injustices of [a] discredited regime or whose position must be taken seriously
because of political changes... " Id. at 21.
86 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631.
87 See id. § 3604.
88 This discussion draws on DUKEMINIER, supranote 68, at 460-61.
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exception-membership in a protected group. If the two testers experience
differential treatment, discrimination may be inferred. The results of the
most recent large-scale study using testers were released in 2013. Although
they showed that most blatant forms of discrimination have declined
sharply over the past four decades, African Americans, Hispanics, and
Asians still experience subtle forms of discrimination. For example,
African American renters who contact real estate agents learn about 11.4
percent fewer available housing units compared with equally qualified
white renters. The disparities for Hispanics and Asians are 12.5 percent and
9.8 percent, respectively.89 Based on such figures, one can say that the Fair
Housing Act is been an attempt at de-marginalizing property that has
achieved mixed success.
Another example of de-marginalizing property is the warranty of
habitability, which applies to all residential leases in nearly all states. 90 As I
noted earlier, 9' this doctrine was first introduced into property law as part of
the tenants' rights movement of the late 1960s and earlier 1970s. Viewed92
narrowly, its purpose was to require landlords to repair blighted housing.
Viewed broadly, it was an effort to de-marginalize poor urban tenants,
many of whom were people of color, by redistributing wealth from
wealthier landlords to poor tenants 93 or by creating conditions for better
lives for the urban poor.94 The results that the warranty of habitability
doctrine actually achieved, however, have fallen far short of either goal.95
There are several markers of the doctrine's failure. A very large
percentage of eviction cases never reach open court. 96 Landlord-tenant
courts, which would hear these disputes, have extremely high default
rates. 9 In the few cases that do reach court, the vast majority are decided
with no reference made to the condition of the premises. 98 Finally, data

89 See U.S. Dept. of HUD, Housing Discrimination Against Racial and Ethnic Minorities
2012 xv (2013).
90 See DUKEMNLER, supra note 68, at 522.
91 See note 144 supra.
92 See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
CAL. L. REv. 389, 394 (2011).
93 See Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low-Income

Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 485,512 (1987),
94 See Carl Schier, Draftsman:Formulationof Policy, 2 PROSPECTUS 227 (1968).
95 See Super, supra note 92, at 394 andpassim.This extraordinary article is well worth
reading in its entirety. The following discussion draws upon Professor Super's piece.
96 See id. at 434.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 435.
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indicate that landlords win in a large percentage of cases brought for nonpayment of rent.99
The habitability doctrine's failure has a number of reasons. For one,
low-income tenants are often unaware of the doctrine's existence. Even if
they are aware of its existence, tenants often lack incentives assert the
doctrine. As Professor David Super explains:
inducing tenants in tight housing markets to assert the warranty requires
highly favorable values for the other elements in the calculation, including the
tenant's chances of winning in the initial action and in avoiding retaliation,
the damages (or rent abatement) awarded, and the likelihood that the
00 landlord
will repair. [T]his combination of circumstances is quite unlikely.1
Moreover, as Super further points out, moving costs skew the warranty's
impact in favor of better-off tenants. 1 1 These moving costs include a
deposit, which must be paid up-front before the tenant has received any
money she may eventually receive as damages in a successful warranty
action. For poor tenants with severely limited available cash, this
effectively means that they must remain in substandard housing. Yet
another factor contributing to the warranty's failure are landlords'
protective orders (LPOs), which are court orders or statutory requirements
that tenants deposit rent with the court during the pendency of these actions
as a condition to being heard on their defenses. 10 2 In Professor Super's
words, for poor tenants,
"these orders may effectively keep the implied
10 3
court.',
of
out
warranty
More recently, we have witnessed the appearance of other novel forms of
de-marginalizing property. Some of these forms really do not aim at demarginalizing groups as much as simply housing individuals, getting them
off the streets. An example is urban homesteading. Cities like New York
have policies that encourage squatters in abandoned buildings to improve
the properties in which they live. 0 4 In New York, the phenomenon began
during the 1980s, when squatters took over many old tenement building in
Manhattan's Lower East Side that owners had simply abandoned. In 2002,
the City of New York granted ownership of eleven of these squats to the
Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB), a private not-for-profit
organization. 1° UHAB provides loans for essential renovations to bring the
" See id. at 437.
Id. at 409.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act § 4.105.
103 Super, supra note 92, at 426.
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100
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buildings up to city code regulations, after which the city will turn over title
to the occupants for one dollar.
Ownership will be organized in the form of
10 6
a limited-equity cooperative.
In response to the home foreclosure crisis, a growing number of cities
have exercised their power of eminent domain in a remarkably new wayto acquire underwater mortgages. Despite rising home values, there are still
some 9.8 million households underwater, representing 19.4 percent of all
mortgaged homes-nearly one out of every five such homes. 10 7 The
problem disproportionately affects communities of color. In seventy-one of
the one-hundred hardest-hit cities, African Americans and Latinos account
for at least forty percent of the population.0 8 In 146 of the 395 hardest-hit
ZIP codes, African Americans and Latinos account for at least seventy-five
percent of the population.'0 9 Between 2005 and 2009, African Americans
and Latinos have experienced a decline in household wealth, of fifty-two
and sixty-six percent, respectively, compared to sixteen percent for
whites." O The new plan to use eminent domain aims to substantially
alleviate this injustice.
First developed by my colleague Robert Hockett, the plan basically
partners cities with private investors to purchase troubled mortgages at their
fair market value, refinance the mortgage by writing down the principal
owed, and thereby recoup value for all. In the process, the strategy
mitigates urban blight and keeps borrowers, many of whom are people of
color, in their homes. It is a kind of "inverse Kelo" action in which the
eminent domain power is used to keep people in their homes rather than
throw them out."' The city, after purchasing possession, works with each
willing mortgagor to accept discounted repayment of the mortgagor's
obligation. Repayment is set at a level that corresponds to the level at
which the mortgagor can obtain new financing in the current mortgage
market. The mortgagor then conveys the new mortgage to trusts that are
created to collect private investor funds. The city receives discounted
repayment in the form of proceeds from the new mortgage loan. The city
then conveys these proceeds to the trusts, which in turn convey them to the
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private investors as repayment in kind for the moneys that the investors lent
the city upfront to finance the initial condemnation award.112
This innovative strategy has already been adopted or being considered by
several municipalities around the country." 3 Recently, a report from the
Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC-Berkeley, specifically
endorsed the reverse eminent domain strategy. 1 4 Obviously, this is a bold
and unprecedented form of property, but underwater mortgages remain a
deeply entrenched problem for many Americans, especially people of color,
and problems of this magnitude require novel solutions.
A more familiar form of de-marginalizing property is housing subsidies.
A major housing problem today throughout the nation is the high level of
rent, high rent costs have crowded out other financial obligations, and this
has exacerbated the gap between the large majority of low-income people
receiving no major housing subsidies and the minority that do." 5 Yet, as
David Super has pointed out, "direct subsidies have far more potential than
116
regulatory action to improve low-income tenants' housing conditions."
Yet the supply of vouchers comes nowhere close to meeting demand. Only
one in five eligible families receives a voucher today. 117 Housing subsidies
are a form of de-marginalizing property that badly needs revival.
Housing subsidies are not the only form of direct subsidy that needs
resuscitation these days. Food stamps are another. Contrary to some news
reports,"' the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP"),
formerly known as the Food Stamp program, will not come to an end
March 15, 2015.'"9 Nevertheless, Congress recently cut the food stamp
program by $8.6 billion over ten years. 120 The importance of food stamps
112
13
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to people who live at, near, or below the federal poverty line can hardly be
A Department of Agriculture report released this
underestimated.
September stated that fourteen percent of American households remain
food-insecure, that is, had difficulty at some time during the year in
providing enough food for all their members.' 2 '
Food stamps
disproportionately benefit people of color and women. As of 2012, women
were about twice as likely as men (twenty-three percent versus twelve
percent) to have received food stamps at some point in their lives. African
Americans are roughly twice as likely as whites to have received them
during their lives (thirty-one percent versus fifteen percent). Among
22
Latinos, about twenty-two percent said they have received food stamps. 1
It is difficult to measure the success of SNAP with, in terms of reducing
food insecurity, with any precision. Households that do and do not receive
SNAP benefits can differ in systematic ways, complicating the task of
measuring SNAP's success rate. A study that uses instrumental variable
models to control for the endogeneity of SNAP receipt shows that the
receipt of SNAP benefits reduces the likelihood of being food insecure food
insecure. 123 The study provides evidence that SNAP is meeting its key goal
of reducing food-related hardship. Hence, a robust food stamp program
would be an effective form of de-marginalizing property.
A tension exists between extant property interests and the interests of
members of marginalized groups, for the real legal, political, and social
changes that are necessary to fundamentally improve the lives of these
individuals-require redistribution of wealth. These changes involve not
simply making the pie bigger, but changing how the pieces of the pie are
distributed. De-marginalization is a matter of relative position, i.e., how the
worst-off members of society are economically situated, not in absolute
terms, but relative to the rest of society. Even if my thin wedge of the new,
bigger pie is larger than its former counterpart, making me better-off in
absolute terms, I remain marginalized if the wedges of everyone else also
have grown proportionately larger.
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In today's political environmental the prospects of effecting such
redistribution through legislation are not good, to say the least. Alternative
methods must be sought. One is through changes in property doctrines that
have the potential to use property law in a way that goes beyond its
traditional role in promoting order and stability and instead to fulfill its
potential to shift entitlements. Some property doctrines do this already.
What I am talking about is a matter of exploiting the potential of these and
other doctrines to effect further change. This is what Eduardo Pefialver and
124
Sonia Katyal have in mind in their wonderful article, Property Outlaws.

By that term, Pefialver and Katyal refer to individuals who have
deliberately encroached upon the settled property rights of others. The term
includes situations such as adverse possessors, persons who trespass for
reasons of necessity, and persons who trespass as an express of political
protest. Pefialver and Katyal argue that "the apparent order and stability
that property law provides owe much to the destabilizing role of the
125
lawbreaker, who occasionally forces shifts of entitlements and laws.'
They argue in favor of an expansion of doctrines like the necessity defense
to allow redistribution of entitlements in ways 26that track the demarginalizing role of property I have described here. 1
This proposal will likely strike most of us as an extreme, even
outrageous, method of addressing the problem of social and economic
marginalization. Perhaps it is. However, in a society that is unwilling to
take substantial measures in an open and frontal way at alleviating the
property (or non-property) conditions of marginalized groups, it is hardly
surprising that legal scholars propose highly novel means of redistributing
entitlements. Legal doctrine is pliable, at least to a degree, and in the
absence of legislative action progressive legal theorists have no alternative
but doctrine as the means of advancing the project of de-marginalizing
property.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is time to wrap things up. Perhaps my five pieces-the recurrent themes
I have noted-are not so easy after all. Still, I hope enough has been said
here to indicate their fundamental importance to an understanding of
American property law. The pieces-conceptualizing property, categorizing
property, historicizing property, enforcing property, de-marginalizing
property-do not appear in Gilbert's or other commercial outlines, but
124
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students will gain a much firmer grasp of the property doctrines covered in
those outlines if they understand property law's recurrent themes. Finally,
the doctrines will become easy for them like Bobby Dupea's piano pieces
through the same method he used-practice, practice, and more practice.

